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Transforming (perceived) rigidity in environmental law through adaptive
governance: a case of Endangered Species Act implementation
Hannah Gosnell 1, Brian C. Chaffin 2, J. B. Ruhl 3, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold 4, Robin K. Craig 5, Melinda H. Benson 6 and Alan
Devenish 1
ABSTRACT. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is often portrayed as a major source of instability and crisis in river basins of the U.
S. West, where the needs of listed fish species frequently clash with agriculture dependent on federal irrigation projects subject to ESA
Section 7 prohibitions on federal agency actions likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat. Scholarship on
Section 7 characterizes the process as unwaveringly rigid, the legal “hammer” forcing federal agencies to consider endangered species’
needs when proposing operations and management plans for federally funded irrigation. In this paper, we identify barriers to an
integrated approach to Section 7 implementation and characterize a set of strategies for overcoming its rigidity that may have broader
applicability. We draw on lessons derived from the Klamath Basin along the Oregon-California border, where cross-scale processes and
venues involving interagency collaboration among leaders in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service,
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation supported efforts to replace an ecologically and socially fragmented Upper Basin/Lower Basin
approach to ESA implementation fraught with conflict. The result was the nation’s first joint biological opinion (BiOp), which effectively
institutionalized an adaptive, flexible, integrated approach to water sharing among competing interests. Keys to success included existing
collaborative capacity related to shifting stakeholder networks, trust, and relationships and a shift in local agency culture facilitated
by empathic leadership leading to a greater sense of shared responsibility for Section 7 compliance. A collaborative hydrologic modeling
process enhanced participatory capacity, facilitated transformative social and technical learning, and cultivated greater understanding
of the social-ecological system among key stakeholders. The 2013 joint BiOp exemplifies both governmental capacity for flexibility
and evolution within the constraints of formal law and the potential for greater integration among federal agencies and between federal
agencies and stakeholders involved in ESA implementation.
Key Words: adaptive capacity; biodiversity governance; biological opinion; collaboration; empathy; Endangered Species Act; hydrologic
modeling; integrated natural resource management; Klamath Basin; participatory capacity; resilience; Section 7 consultation; trust
INTRODUCTION
Within the realm of natural resource management—the proving
ground for theories of social-ecological system (SES) resilience
—it is hard to imagine a better example of system “release” and
“reorganization” (Holling 2001) than the almost predictable
turbulence regularly caused by implementation of Section 7 of
the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) (16 U.S.C. § 1536). No
incident better illustrates that potential than the events
surrounding implementation of Section 7 in the Klamath Basin
in 2001 (Fig. 1), when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued
separate biological opinions (BiOps) that resulted (pursuant to a
federal court opinion) in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
shutting off  water to roughly 1200 family farms during a drought,
leaving hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland without
irrigation and leading to an estimated $35 million in lost farm
income (Jaeger 2004, Doremus and Tarlock 2008). The story of
how community members and resource managers navigated
subsequent aftershocks and ultimately reorganized over the
following decade has been the subject of numerous journal
articles, books, and documentaries (e.g., Doremus and Tarlock
2008, Gosnell and Kelly 2010, Chaffin et al. 2014a, Chaffin et al.
2016a). Although there is debate about the degree to which lasting
transformation of the Klamath Basin SES has occurred in the
wake of the 2001 crisis (Chaffin et al. 2016b), many agree that
there was a significant increase in collaborative capacity during
negotiations surrounding the proposed Klamath Basin
Restoration Agreement (Gosnell and Kelly 2010, U.S.
Department of the Interior 2010, Chaffin et al. 2016a). The
improved collaboration aligned in many ways with the principles
of adaptive governance, that is, governance institutions that
emerge to more flexibly manage SESs for resilience in the face of
changing conditions (Folke et al. 2005, Chaffin et al. 2014b).  
Contributing to that dynamic was the development of an
innovative approach to Section 7 implementation that resulted in
the nation’s first joint BiOp between FWS and NMFS. Although
it addressed only BOR’s actions in the basin (which, admittedly,
are only part of the problem), and a court has since ordered
reinitiation of formal consultation between NMFS, FWS, and
BOR (Hoopa Valley Tribe v. National Marine Fisheries Service,
230 F. Supp. 3d 1106 [N.D. Cal. 2017], Yurok Tribe v. Bureau of
Reclamation 231 F. Supp. 3d 450 [N.D. Cal. 2017]), the 2013 joint
BiOp stands as a model of integrated natural resource
management and provides evidence that, under the right
conditions, collaborative strategies aimed at enhancing adaptive
capacity can overcome many of the constraints associated with
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Fig. 1. Map of the Klamath Basin.
the Section 7 consultation process. We seek to characterize the
governance conditions that influenced and led to this novel,
although temporary, outcome in the Klamath Basin. Focusing on
the important role that federal agencies played in better aligning
Section 7 implementation in the Klamath with principles of
adaptive governance and resilience-based ecosystem stewardship
(Chapin et al. 2009), we identify general principles and strategies
that potentially could be used in other contested bioregional
management contexts subject to Section 7 and similar federal and
state programs. We also consider limitations associated with
Section 7’s arguably myopic focus on federal actions, which
challenge bioregional conservation efforts.  
The ESA is comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species and has long been one of the most powerful
environmental laws in the United States (Sax and Keiter 2006).
It plays an important role in the management of river basins
throughout the USA (Benson 2012, Craig 2014). This is especially
true in the arid West, where the needs of ESA-listed (endangered
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or threatened) fish species frequently clash with agriculture
dependent on federally funded irrigation projects subject to
Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 requires federal agencies to
“consult” with the FWS or NMFS to ensure that their actions
are not likely to jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify its
critical habitat. Because the ESA mandates that federal agencies
(1) consider only “best available science” (and not socioeconomic
factors) when consulting on federal actions that may have an
impact on listed species; and (2) reverse the trend toward
extinction “whatever the cost” (TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 [1978]),
implementation of the ESA often triggers social and economic
crisis by limiting how humans may use resources that species also
need (Cosens et al. 2017). The Act is disliked and often feared
because it exposes underlying tensions between development and
the environment in courtrooms, news media, and the greater
public discourse (Ruhl 2012).  
Although the ESA is decidedly species-centric—it commands
“listing” of species as endangered or threatened (Section 4),
prohibits “take” of endangered and most threatened animal
species (Section 9), and prohibits federal agencies from
jeopardizing the continued existence of listed species (Section 7)
—it recognizes the importance of ecological systems to its species
protection mission. For example, one of the criteria for listing of
a species is “the present or threatened destruction, modification,
or curtailment of its habitat or range” (Section 4(a)(1), and
“critical habitat” is defined to mean areas “on which are found
those physical or biological features … essential to the
conservation of the species” (Section 3(5)). Moreover, Congress
made clear that the purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved” (Section 2(b)). The
Section 7 consultation process, though ultimately focused on the
status of a species, thus allows for, and in fact requires,
consideration of broader ecological conditions.  
Through the lens of SES resilience (Folke 2006) and adaptive
governance (Folke et al. 2005), the Section 7 consultation process
can be thought of as a legal intervention aimed at identifying
species-centric thresholds, i.e., jeopardy, that, when crossed, signal
ecological crisis associated with a high risk of species extinction.
As one of the few major environmental laws explicitly committed
to identifying and enforcing thresholds associated with
biodiversity, the ESA has the potential to play a major role in
catalyzing system reorganization and, ideally, the development of
more stable and sustainable trajectories. Serving as a canary in
the coal mine, an ESA listing or a BiOp can be an important lever
of change, forcing society to address resource scarcity issues it
may have been avoiding for decades (Saundry 2009).  
Because of its role in causing social crisis, however, and in spite
of Congress’s good intentions, the ESA is generally perceived as
rigid, myopic, and incompatible with resilience thinking. It is
viewed as a barrier to adaptive governance, incapable of
promoting the innovation and creativity necessary for resolving
endangered species issues in the context of SESs associated with
working landscapes (Benson 2012, Gunderson 2013, Gunderson
et al. 2014). Scholars have noted, however, that crises caused by
the implementation of laws like the ESA can eventually lead to
positive reorganization through systemic collapse or threat of
collapse of SESs followed by transformative change (Folke et al.
2009, Olsson et al. 2006, Moore et al. 2014, Chaffin et al. 2016b).
Cosens et al. (2017) observed that top-down regulations such as
the ESA can trigger innovation by presenting only narrow
solutions that are socially and/or economically unacceptable.
Others have noted that even the threat of the “hammer” of
governmental intervention associated with the ESA can act as a
catalyst and alter watershed and basin social dynamics by
incentivizing collaboration among resource users and land
managers to prevent further regulation (Prokopy et al. 2014). The
latter point is consistent with theories that disruptive legal actions
can actually lead to collaboration, more equitable resource
reallocation, and flexible resource management by first
destabilizing rigid power relationships that exploit both resources
and marginalized peoples (Arnold 2004, Karkkainen 2008).  
Although there are some success stories related to implementing
statutes like the ESA, there is a growing need to identify tools for
strategically integrating statutory goals into broader SES
governance, addressing legitimate concerns about community
socioeconomic stability related to operation of federal water
projects, and minimizing social-ecological conflict through
deliberate SES transformation (Moore et al. 2014). Satisfying this
need will involve finding flexibility in the law to allow for
socioeconomic considerations while ensuring ecological goals are
not compromised; in other words, flexibility and adaptability are
needed against a backdrop of stability for both water users and
listed species (Craig et al. 2017). Climate change and associated
drought and habitat loss will only exacerbate the need for new
approaches (Benson 2012).  
In this paper, we dissect the Section 7 consultation process to
illustrate the potential for collaborative strategies to overcome
legal roadblocks to SES management dynamics. We argue that,
aside from its role as a catalyst for change based on crisis, fear,
and instability, Section 7 consultation has the potential to serve
as a forum for learning, strategic reorganization, and stimulating
adaptive governance. Using the history of ESA implementation
in the Klamath Basin as a case study, we compare two different
approaches to implementing Section 7 and identify the social
conditions and strategies that allowed the consultation process to
serve as a powerful tool to help facilitate a more adaptive approach
to river basin governance. We first provide an overview of the
consultation process under Section 7 of the ESA, highlighting the
ways in which it tends to undermine resilience, adaptive
governance, and an integrated approach to resource management.
Then, drawing from qualitative social science research ongoing
in the Klamath River Basin since 2008, including document
analysis and fieldwork involving over 100 semistructured
interviews with stakeholders and key informants associated with
efforts to resolve conflict over water, agriculture, tribal rights, and
endangered species, we contrast (1) the Upper Basin/Lower Basin
approach to Section 7 consultation on listed Lost River and
shortnose sucker fishes (Deltistes luxatus and Chasmistes
brevirostris) and coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) species
taken by the BOR, NMFS, and FWS in the early 2000s, which
resulted in “rotating crises” (Gosnell and Kelly 2010) for
irrigators, tribes, and fishermen; with (2) the more integrated
approach adopted in 2010 that culminated in the 2013 joint BiOp.
In the latter approach, we highlight the importance of interagency
cooperation during consultation, the use of hydrologic modeling
to better understand the whole system, and the engagement of
stakeholders in the search for innovative solutions.  
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We then identify key factors enabling this shift in approach,
including new cross-scale dynamics featuring trust and empathy
and the emergence of a forum for learning and coproduction of
knowledge around water sharing led by a unique coalition of
stakeholders that included prominent leaders from irrigation
groups and basin tribes. We further research on resilience and
adaptive governance by discussing the ways in which these
enabling factors, interagency collaboration, empathic leadership,
and transformational learning about the SES, contributed to an
expanded sense of place, an extended sphere of concern, and
shared ownership of the problem among both stakeholders and
federal agency employees, which facilitated a more integrated
approach to managing SES dynamics. We also consider how
increased attention to the needs of ESA-listed species beyond the
federally funded Klamath Irrigation Project would facilitate an
even more integrated approach. We conclude with a set of
practical lessons for implementing the ESA to promote adaptive
governance.
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION AND THE CHALLENGE
OF INTEGRATED ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE
Although the Section 7 consultation process is well-established,
few have fully considered the ways in which the governance
structure and process associated with interagency consultation
tend to challenge SES resilience, social-economic stability, and
the potential for adaptive governance. We build on Benson’s
(2012) more general assessment of the ESA, which argues that
the law contradicts resilience-based governance, i.e., adaptive
governance, by promoting fragmented natural resource
management that focuses on single species rather than system
dynamics and seeks to optimize parts of the system rather than
fostering adaptive capacity and resilience throughout the SES.
Benson (2012) argues for “a more integrated approach to
governance that includes a willingness to reassess demands placed
on ecological systems by our social systems.” Inattention to such
principles of integrated natural resource management is perhaps
the most common criticism of the ESA (e.g., Gunderson 2013).  
An integrated, problem-solving approach increases capacity for
learning and adaptation in the conservation planning process and
is an important aspect of adaptive governance (Benson 2012,
Carpenter and Brock 2008, Pahl-Wostl 2009, Grantham et al.
2010, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013, Cosens et al. 2017). Law and
resilience scholars describe integration in the law as “mutual
cognizance and legal authority for coordination across all
governance institutions that influence environmental management
and regulation of physically connected resources” (Cosens et al.
2017). One way law can facilitate adaptive governance is through
interagency cooperation and coordination aimed at creative
problem-solving when confronted with governance problems with
cross-agency and cross-scale dimensions. Integrated resource
management and interagency cooperation can also create
opportunities to engage diverse stakeholders meaningfully in
decision making (Arnold et al. 2014, Arnold 2015). We suggest
that many of the problematic aspects of ESA Section 7
consultation have more to do with lack of integration among
federal agencies implementing the law and poor relations with
stakeholders than with the law itself, and that the degree to which
the ESA promotes or inhibits adaptive governance is largely
contingent on interagency dynamics as well as stakeholder-agency
dynamics.
Interagency dynamics in Section 7 consultation: navigating silos
Section 7, titled “Interagency Cooperation,” describes a process
through which federal agencies work together to ensure that they
are contributing to the mission of protecting and recovering listed
species. Nevertheless, actual implementation of Section 7 often
occurs in a fragmented way that can result in a reactive, inefficient
approach to biodiversity governance.  
Section 7 consists of both prohibitory and affirmative obligations,
but it is best known for Section 7(a)(2), which requires that each
federal agency carrying out a major action (the “action agency”
such as the Bureau of Reclamation or U.S. Forest Service)
“consult” with FWS and/or NMFS (depending on the majority
habitat of the species, FWS for terrestrial species, NMFS for
marine and anadromous species) to “insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency … is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species
or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of [critical] habitat.” Under this arrangement, as
implemented through joint FWS/NMFS regulations, the onus is
on the action agency to (1) determine whether listed species are
present in the area of its proposed action; and, if  so, (2) develop
a biological assessment (BA) that describes the proposed action
and its anticipated effects on the listed species; and (3) if  the action
and consulting agency conclude the proposed action is likely to
adversely affect a listed species, request formal consultation with
FWS or NMFS (collectively “the Services”). The Services then
evaluate the BA and offer a draft BiOp stating whether the
proposed action is likely to cause jeopardy and/or adverse
modification of critical habitat. If  the draft BiOp anticipates
jeopardy, it will generally include one or more reasonable and
prudent alternatives (RPAs), which modify the proposed action
to eliminate jeopardy. The development of the RPAs is subject to
negotiation between the action agency and the Services, which
ultimately issue a final BiOp determining, in the consulting
agency’s or agencies’ opinion, whether the proposed action can
go forward without violating Section 7. Although, technically, the
final decision on whether and how to proceed with the proposed
action remains with the action agency, BiOps legally are very
influential, as the Klamath Basin history demonstrates.  
It is important to note that BiOps really are just opinions, nearly
always based on incomplete information about the species and
the larger biophysical system, so there is some flexibility and
discretion in how the Services seek compliance with Section 7.
That flexibility is tempered, however, by the dynamics between
action agencies and the Services, as well as by the principle of
institutionalized caution (“precautionary principle”) and the fact
that citizens can challenge BiOps in court.  
Consultation can, in some cases, be adversarial and political,
characterized by a lack of transparency, information sharing, and
dialogue as the action agency tries to get its proposed action
approved (Gosnell 2001). We suggest, however, that such conflict
is not inherent in the law; that is, differences in agency culture and
poor governance, not lack of authority, are mainly to blame for
problems with agency coordination.  
Another issue of interagency dynamics associated with the
Section 7 consultation process that runs counter to integration is
in the division of labor between the FWS, in the Department of
Interior, and NMFS, in the Department of Commerce. This
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shared responsibility for implementing the Act can be problematic
in SESs or geographic contexts where federal actions impact both
terrestrial and marine species, e.g., in river basins of the Pacific
Northwest with both freshwater and anadromous fish species,
because of differences in agency culture and the way the two
agencies approach ESA implementation. Generally, FWS and
NMFS will issue separate BiOps regarding the same proposed
action, each one focused on the needs of “its” species, even when
the proposed action affects shared habitat upon which all the listed
species depend. In part to avoid the possibility of mutually
contradictory advice from the two agencies, the Section 7
Consultation Handbook notes that “coordination between FWS
and NMFS is critical to ensure any reasonable and prudent
alternatives prescribed by both the Services … are compatible …
so the action agency can implement both opinions without further
consultation” (USFWS and NMFS 1998:2-14). However, the law
does not require coordination and integration and thus they are
not guaranteed. As a result, FWS and NMFS BiOps on the same
proposed action, e.g., implementing a dam or reclamation project,
can be at cross purposes and even undermine one another, as has
been the case in the Klamath Basin, where anadromous and
freshwater fish species have competing needs.
Stakeholder-agency dynamics in Section 7 implementation: trade-
offs between legitimacy and participatory capacity
The ways in which federal agencies interact with stakeholders
during Section 7 consultation also can have significant bearing
on the potential for integrated adaptive governance. Resilience
scholars argue that allowing key stakeholders to participate in
decision making enhances social learning, motivation, and
compliance with policy and law; lack of participatory capacity,
defined as the right and resources of interested persons and
groups to have a role in decision making (Huitema et al. 2009), is
a barrier to adaptive governance (Chaffin et al. 2014b, Cosens et
al. 2017). “Participatory capacity reduces the likelihood of
marginalization of portions of society and, in doing so, increases
the likelihood that all aspects of a system will be considered in
decision-making” (Cosens et al. 2017). Authentic participation
plays an important role in adaptive governance because it helps
enhance the perception of legitimacy among stakeholders; people
look to it for reassurance during difficult or uncertain situations
(Armitage et al. 2008). Legitimacy can be obtained through
participatory democracy where stakeholders contribute to
“feedback, design, decision making, or implementation of
governance” (De Caro et al. 2017).  
Stakeholder participation in resource management occurs along
a theoretical spectrum, from “inform” to “consult” to “involve”
to “collaborate” (duToit and Pollard 2008), but collaboration does
not ensure authentic participation. Collaboration can perpetuate
structural inequalities and actually reduce the participation of
marginalized groups in environmental and resource governance
(Foster 2002, Shilling et al. 2009). Collaborative processes are
more likely to be socially just and truly participatory if  they
include the empowerment of marginalized communities, inclusive
or meaningful processes, the use of diverse participatory methods,
and a mix of formal legal tools (e.g., litigation, regulation,
enforcement actions) and informal collaborative tools (Larson
and Lach 2010, Quick and Feldman 2011, Arnold et al. 2014).  
Section 7 takes an alternate approach to seeking legitimacy
through legal requirements for science-based decision making in
the preparation of a BiOp, and, under the FWS and NMFS joint
implementation regulations, is relatively silent about the need for
and role of stakeholder input and/or participation during the
consultation process. Relying only on best available science for
legitimacy arguably conflicts with principles of good governance
and theoretically undermines the potential for compatibility
between adaptive governance and the ESA by limiting
participatory capacity and hindering social and technical
learning. It can also lead to an adversarial dynamic, prone to
litigation, between federal agencies and stakeholders, which may
result in risk avoidance and lack of innovation in the Services’
preparation of BiOps. As Benson (2012) observes, “ESA
management efforts are often geared towards avoiding lawsuits
rather than building resilience,” e.g., the motivation behind any
effort to engage stakeholders is likely more about avoiding
challenges to the final decision than about working on creative
solutions.  
The Klamath case, introduced below, illustrates the ways in which
lack of integration in Section 7 consultation can manifest, both
in interagency relations and in stakeholder-agency relations, but
also how these dynamics can shift. We suggest that the approach
to implementing Section 7 that culminated in the 2013 BiOp in
many ways embodies the shifts called for by law and resilience
scholars (e.g., Benson 2012, Gunderson 2013, Cosens et al. 2017),
as well as demonstrates the ability of the ESA to support rather
than undermine SES resilience and adaptive governance.
SECTION 7 IMPLEMENTATION IN THE KLAMATH
BASIN, 1988–2008: AN UPPER BASIN/LOWER BASIN
APPROACH
Since development of the federal Klamath Irrigation Project
(KIP) in the early 20th century, the BOR has cultivated a strong
relationship with its constituents, the farmers associated with the
Klamath Water Users Association (KWUA) who use KIP water
for irrigation. The ESA listing of two species of sucker fish in the
Upper Basin in 1988 forced BOR to begin consulting with FWS
on KIP operations (see Table 1 for chronology), and the federal
agencies developed a dynamic in which BOR worked with
irrigators to develop a proposed action for KIP operations based
on the farmers’ irrigation needs, and then delivered it along with
a BA to the FWS (and later to NMFS when the coho salmon were
listed in 1997) in anticipation of BiOp(s) that would allow it to
continue operations as normal.  
Prior to 2013, NMFS and FWS issued BiOps separately and in
isolation of one another, as illustrated in Figure 2. NMFS
represented the needs of salmon and, by extension, the interests
of three Lower Basin tribes (Karuk, Yurok, and Hoopa Valley)
and commercial fishermen in the development of its BiOps. FWS,
in turn, represented the needs of the suckers, and, by extension,
the interests of the Klamath Tribes in the development of its
BiOps. The Services left it to BOR to address their uncoordinated
demands, which generally consisted of minimum Upper Klamath
Lake (UKL) levels for the suckers in the Upper Basin and
minimum instream flows for salmon in the Lower Basin, two water
demands potentially at odds with each other as well as being
individually and collectively at odds with farmers’ desires to
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Table 1. Chronology of events related to implementation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act in the Klamath Basin.
 
1967 The Lost River sucker (LRS; Deltistes luxatus) is listed as “rare” under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA).
1971 The Shortnose sucker (SNS; Chasmistes brevirostris) is listed as “rare” under CESA.
1971 Both sucker species are identified as “species of concern” under CESA.
1986 The Klamath Tribes close their subsistence sucker fishery to conserve the species.
Hundreds of adult suckers die during the summer months in Upper Klamath Lake (UKL).
1988 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) lists both sucker species as “endangered” under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).
1992 The Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) prepares the first Biological Assessment (BA) for the Klamath Irrigation Project (KIP) operations; FWS
issues the first Biological Opinion (BiOp) for the sucker species, imposing minimum lake levels for UKL.
1995–1997 Thousands of suckers die during the summers in UKL.
1997 The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) lists the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast (SONCC) Evolutionarily Significant Unit
(ESU) of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), the Southern Distinct Population Segment (DPS) of green sturgeon (Acipenser medirostris), and
the Southern DPS of eulachon (Thaleichthys pacificus) as “threatened” under the federal ESA.
2001 BOR prepares a BA for proposed KIP operations.
FWS issues a jeopardy BiOp for the two sucker species.
NMFS issues a jeopardy BiOp for the coho salmon.
BOR limits the volume of water delivered to KIP users to comply with the jeopardy BiOps, leading to social and economic hardship for
irrigators.
2002 BOR prepares a new BA for KIP operations spanning 2002–2012 and requests reinitiation of consultation with FWS and NMFS.
Both agencies again issue jeopardy BiOps with reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) that call for reduced water deliveries.
Disregarding the BiOps, and in spite of continued drought, BOR provides full water deliveries to irrigators during summer 2002.
Curtailed flows in the Lower Basin lead to poor water quality and, in September, more than 30,000 adult salmonids (primarily unlisted
Chinook, Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) die from a bacterial pathogen (columnaris) associated with low flows and high stream temperatures.
Lawsuits by tribes, environmental organizations, and commercial fishermen result in a federal district court ordering the BOR to reinitiate
consultation with FWS and NMFS.
2005 The coho salmon is listed as “threatened” under the CESA.
2005–2009 The commercial salmon fishing harvest is closed and/or restricted.
2006 Settlement talks associated with the Klamath hydroelectric dam relicensing process morph into an “Extended Caucus” that creates the
foundation for developing the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) and the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA)
over the next four years. (See Gosnell and Kelly 2010 for details regarding the KBRA/KHSA development and the process’s influence on tribal/
irrigator power relations.)
2007 BOR reinitiates consultation with FWS and NMFS, proposing to change its operations to address concerns with its monthly time-step
approach to managing UKL elevations and downstream flows.
FWS issues a nonjeopardy BiOp for suckers after working with BOR to refine the proposed action for the time period spanning 2007–2017.
2008 NMFS issues a draft jeopardy BiOp for the coho, which conflicts with the FWS’s 2007 nonjeopardy BiOp.
BOR requests that NMFS suspend the finalization of the consultation process and BiOp until further notice.
2010 BOR requests that NMFS finalize its BiOp for the KIP.
NMFS issues a final jeopardy BiOp regarding the coho for KIP operations from 2010–2018, with an RPA that calls for downstream flows that,
when combined with KIP operations, would result in lower UKL levels than those approved in the 2007 FWS BiOp.
It becomes apparent that, under certain hydrologic conditions, BOR will be unable to meet the expectations of KIP water users and the two
BiOps, putting the agency in an untenable position. It also becomes apparent that FWS will have to reinitiate consultation to evaluate the effects
of the NMFS RPA on the two sucker species, scrapping much of the work that it had done to develop the 2007 BiOp.
Regional Directors for the three federal agencies, the BOR’s Mid Pacific Regional Director, NMFS‛ Southwest Regional Administrator, and the
FWS’s Pacific Southwest Regional Director, meet with their respective field office managers and direct them to develop a new proposed action
and the nation’s first joint BiOp.
Basin stakeholders sign initial drafts of the KBRA and KHSA, which represent the culmination of four years of talks regarding a “whole
basin” approach to social-ecological restoration.
2012 BOR finalizes a new proposed action based on the results of its hydrologic modeling of the Klamath system, issues a new BA, and requests
formal consultation with FWS and NMFS to develop a joint BiOp.
2013 FWS and NMFS issue a nonjeopardy joint BiOp.
In March, the Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) delivers its Findings of Fact and an Order of Determination in the Klamath
River Basin Adjudication regarding water rights in the Klamath Basin (within the state of Oregon) to the Klamath County Circuit Court.
Adjudication-related proceedings in the Oregon portion of the Klamath Basin had been conducted since 1975, with significant implications for
Klamath Tribes’ water rights and feasibility of in-stream flows to support sucker recovery. OWRD’s Findings determine that the Klamath
Tribes have the most senior and very large water rights in the system and quantify those rights for the first time.
In June, the Klamath Tribes “call the river”† based on their newly quantified and legally enforceable water rights; OWRD enforces call and shuts
off  water to off-project farmers and ranchers above the lake and in, around, and above historical reservation lands. BOR, FWS, and four
irrigation districts immediately follow with their own calls on the river, but because of drought conditions, these senior users’ demands exceed
the available flows.
In fall, the off-project irrigators, mostly located in the basin headwaters northeast of or above the historic reservation boundary, return to the
negotiating table as a result of the June call on the river by the Klamath Tribes and the subsequent economic hardship suffered by nontribal,
off-project agricultural producers that year. Some of these irrigators are also instrumental leaders in the public opposition to the KBRA and
KHSA that had been voiced since 2010.
2014 In April, the parties sign the Upper Klamath Basin Comprehensive Agreement (UKBCA), bringing off-project irrigators and irrigation back
into the comprehensive basin water settlement agreements. This agreement is combined with the KBRA and KHSA.
2015 In December, the Klamath Basin Agreements (KBRA, KHSA, UKBCA) expire when the U.S. Congress fails to authorize and fund them
through federal legislation.
2016 In April, the parties sign the Klamath Power and Facilities Agreement (KPFA) and an amended KHSA at a large public ceremony at the
Klamath River’s mouth that includes an appearance by U.S. Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell. This agreement has very little to do with the
KBRA and basin restoration; instead, it settles the outstanding Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) process that required the KHP
to be either relicensed or decommissioned and facilities removed. The Agreements authorize the removal of the four mainstem Klamath dams
by 2020 and do not require congressional authorization or funding.
(con'd)
Ecology and Society 22(4): 42
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss4/art42/
In June and July, the Yurok Tribes sue BOR and NMFS for mismanagement of endangered salmon in the Klamath River. A Ceratonova shasta 
parasite outbreak causes the Yurok to suspend fishing throughout 2016. The disease’s prevalence is attributed to unhealthily high concentrations
of salmon in the river. The Yurok suit follows the NMFS decision to reduce salmon protections rather than divert water away from the KIP and
irrigation.
2017 In February, a federal district court orders a review of the 2013 BiOp to re-evaluate the BOR’s operating plan to protect threatened coho salmon
in the Lower Klamath Basin (Hoopa Valley Tribe v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 230 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Yurok Tribe v.
Bureau of Reclamation 231 F. Supp. 3d 450 (N.D. Cal. 2017)).
In April and May, the Klamath Tribes call the river† again (as in 2013) because they perceive insufficient water system recharge since the end of
the drought.
†“Calling the river” is the somewhat colloquial expression for the process by which a senior water rights holder in a prior appropriation state enforces that senior right
against more junior rights holders in times of water shortage. The exact process of enforcement varies by state but generally involves notification to a state official of the
need to shut down junior appropriators and then notice to juniors and/or physical closure of their diversion structures.
withdraw water for irrigation. BOR’s task was to develop an
annual operating plan for KIP that would meet the needs of
farmers reliant on KIP water while acknowledging the constraints
of the two BiOps. The poor relationship between the federal
agencies was recognized by people in both FWS and NMFS:  
Basically I think the feeling was that every agency was
out for themselves … and [with BOR] having control of
the water, the two agencies [FWS and NMFS] had
responsibility for just developing their own BiOps and
giving them to [BOR]. There wasn’t much of any concern
[on the part of NMFS] for the water users for what the
impact would be … or for our fish upstream either …
There was just not that much coordination going on
between the agencies and when we did BiOps we basically
did them in isolation. (Interview, FWS) 
The federal team was also fighting in the basin. We
weren’t getting along. We were being pitted against each
other, just like the stakeholders were. The culture of not
trusting, not trying to build a relationship, that’s where
we were. It was battlegrounds essentially. I had bad
relationships with [BOR], bad. Very bad. It was terrible!
They’re just like, “Consult on this!” It was just nothing
like it is today. It’s been transformed, that process. 
(Interview, NMFS) 
The lack of coordination also caused intense frustration among
the water users:  
There’s been, in my mind over the years, just an utter lack
of coordination amongst Bureau of Reclamation, Fish
and Wildlife, and National Marine Fisheries…. They just
drive me crazy. The agencies. Our plea has been, or the
case we’re trying to make is, we’re about to fall off the
cliff if we don’t do something a little different. At least
try to get some coordination. (Interview, KWUA) 
This dynamic resulted in crisis beginning in 2001 when BOR
consulted with FWS and NMFS about its planned operations for
KIP. Acting independently, the Services concluded that proposed
KIP operations would likely jeopardize the continued existence
of both the two sucker species in the Upper Basin and the coho
salmon in the Lower Basin. As a result of drought and low inflows
to KIP reservoirs during the previous winter and spring, and ESA
requirements for minimum lake levels and river flows, BOR was
forced to limit the amount of water delivered to irrigators, leading
to the abrupt water shutoff, economic crisis, and social upheaval
described earlier.
Fig. 2. Section 7 Consultation Process pre-2013: Upper Basin/
Lower Basin Approach. Irrigators worked with Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) to develop a proposed action (PA). BOR
delivered PA to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) separately. Lower
Basin Tribes and fishermen sought to influence NMFS in
development of coho biological opinion (BiOp). Klamath
Tribes sought to influence FWS in development of suckers
BiOp. FWS delivered suckers BiOp to BOR. NMFS delivered
coho BiOp to BOR. Process featured little or no collaboration
between BOR and FWS or NMFS in development of PA, and
little or no coordination between FWS and NMFS in
development of BiOps for BOR.
The controversial nature of the FWS and NMFS 2001 BiOps led
to a call for external scientific review by a U.S. National
Academies of Science/National Research Council (NRC) panel
(Doremus and Tarlock 2008, NRC 2004). In February 2002, the
Panel released an interim report (NRC 2002) on their assessment
of the BiOps and the two 2001 BAs produced by BOR that
concluded that there was insufficient scientific and technical
information to support the Services’ recommendations for higher
lake levels (FWS BiOp) and higher Klamath River flows (NMFS
BiOp) as well as for the BOR’s KIP plan.  
The BOR read the NRC preliminary report as the “best available
science” and responded by releasing a new long-term operation
plan (2002–2012) that used the lake level and river flow thresholds
applied between 1990 and 2000, thresholds that had been deemed
insufficient to protect species in the 2001 BiOps. The BOR
adhered to this operation plan during the low precipitation spring
and summer of 2002, continuing to deliver water to project
farmers. In September 2002, low water flows in the Lower Basin
combined with drought conditions created a low oxygen
environment ideal for the rapid spread of disease among returning
(migrating) fall Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha;
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CDFG 2004). The California Department of Fish and Game
estimated that in just 4 days, over 30,000 Chinook salmon died in
the Klamath River below Iron Gate Dam (CDFG 2004).
Although this population of Chinook salmon is not protected
under the ESA, the species is culturally significant to the Lower
Basin tribes and critical to the economic viability of commercial
fishing communities along the coast of California, Washington,
and Oregon. This abrupt social, ecological, and economic loss
effectively relocated the Klamath crisis to the Lower Basin, further
revealing the inadequacy of the siloed approach to Section 7
implementation. The 2002 consultation that led to this tragedy
and an additional consultation in 2007 (Table 1) made it
increasingly clear that the split Upper Basin/Lower Basin
approach was untenable. Figure 2 illustrates this “dis-integrated”
consultation dynamic, which had a negative effect on the fish, the
water users, and other stakeholders in the basin.  
Contributing to BOR’s water balancing challenge was an
outdated approach to operations that relied on uncertain early-
season runoff forecasts and historical water use to forecast water
supply once per month. This approach frequently resulted in
forecasts predicting more water than actually became available,
leading to BOR releasing too much water early in the season and
then experiencing unanticipated shortages later. Irrigators
expressed frustration with this approach:  
These guys [irrigators] all have to make management
decisions early in the year, right? Are you going to buy
seed, are you planting, which acres are you planting? And
to do that you gotta know how much water you got. And
… what happens is you sort of assume it’s gonna be like
most years in the past and you’re gonna have enough
water, and so you plant it, and then, you know, you could
get to June or July … “Hey, you know, we got to shut off
for couple weeks.” No, that doesn’t work. So that was a
big deal for us … For us, it’s about stability here. You’ve
got just a tough ag economy and inability to know what
you’ve got with water just makes it that much worse. 
(Interview, KWUA) 
Lower Basin tribes were dissatisfied with the approach to water
sharing associated with ESA compliance for a different reason.
Rather than the minimum downstream flows required by NMFS,
they wanted more variability in timing of flows to mimic the
natural hydrologic regime, e.g., big spring pulses, in order to
facilitate salmon recovery.  
Our interviews revealed three important dynamics related to the
Upper Basin/Lower Basin approach. First, the process featured
little or no collaboration between BOR and the Services in the
development of the proposed action. As a result, it led to a reactive
approach that was inefficient and involved a lot of back and forth
as the BOR tried to incorporate “real-time” consideration of the
fishes’ needs, based on recent data, into the proposed action over
multiple meetings and drafts. Several times, the Services felt
compelled to issue jeopardy opinions because BOR was not
addressing the fishes’ needs. Second, there was little or no
coordination between FWS and NMFS in the development of
their respective BiOps for BOR, which resulted in a fragmented,
single-species approach to ecosystem management. Third, the
stakeholders’ unanimous frustration with ESA implementation
resulted in both fighting with each other and blaming the agencies
for their problems. Furthermore, there were communication gaps
resulting from lack of timely coordination among the agencies
that led to reduced trust and any sense that local input had value.  
Concurrent with growing agency recognition of the problems
associated with Section 7 implementation was a period of media
warfare following the tragic fish kill of 2002, which contributed
to public perception of polarization in the basin. Adversaries were
variously characterized as “tribes vs. irrigators,” “Upper Basin vs.
Lower Basin,” and “federal agencies vs. local stakeholders.”
Around 2004, outside the scope of ongoing Section 7
consultation, leaders of basin tribes, irrigation groups,
environmental and conservation NGOs, and federal agencies
initiated a series of uncoordinated side meetings across the basin
to discuss the potential for collaborative paths toward more
integrated, basin-wide water and resource management (Gosnell
and Kelly 2010). As side meetings became more coordinated and
gained traction among a relatively representative group of
stakeholder leaders in the basin, many of these leaders (on behalf
of their constituent groups) intervened in the owner-initiated
(PacifiCorp) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
relicensing process for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project (KHP)
around 2005. This process evolved into a venue to discuss water
management problems across the entire basin, including the
potential federal settlement of the Klamath Tribes’ claims to
unquantified water rights in the Upper Basin actively being sought
by the state of Oregon in the Klamath Basin Water Adjudication
Court. These discussions would eventually culminate in a series
of agreements among stakeholders, the Klamath Basin
Restoration Agreement (KBRA), and Klamath Basin
Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA), released to the
public in 2010 and aimed at holistic basin restoration and water
sharing (Gosnell and Kelly 2010, Chaffin et al. 2014a). These
agreements required congressional authorization and funding
and, after not receiving either, expired in 2016. However, the
capacity built among stakeholders during the processes of
negotiating these agreements also manifested in the development
of the 2013 BiOp and is arguably still latent in the basin, awaiting
the next iteration of efforts to resolve water and associated natural
resources conflict (Chaffin et al. 2016b).  
A window of opportunity (Olsson et al. 2006) opened in 2010
when NMFS issued yet another jeopardy BiOp for the Lower
Basin that conflicted with (and essentially negated) an earlier
nonjeopardy BiOp issued by FWS for the Upper Basin (Table 1).
Frustration came to a head over the lack of agency coordination
in Section 7 implementation, and the need to identify a new, more
coordinated approach became painfully apparent. The crisis
resulted in resolve to pursue a joint BiOp emanating from both
the Services’ regional directors and from national leadership in
Washington D.C. “The FWS was very unhappy with [the 2010
NMFS BiOp] because it didn’t take into account the needs of the
suckers upstream. There was dissatisfaction here in the basin …
and folks in D.C. did a lot of pushing” (Interview, FWS).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE 2013 KLAMATH PROJECT
JOINT BIOLOGICAL OPINION: AN SES APPROACH TO
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION?
To facilitate a more coordinated approach, regional directors for
FWS, NMFS, and BOR met with their respective field office
managers in November 2010 and directed them to develop a new
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proposed action and joint BiOp. As one FWS employee observed,
“we needed to come up with a proposed action that would work
for everybody” (Interview, FWS). The goal was to take a more
proactive and coordinated approach to developing a proposed
action that would meet the conservation needs of the listed species
while allowing continued operation of KIP in alignment with its
authorized purposes and contractual obligations. Federal agency
leaders established an Agency Coordination Team comprising
biologists, hydrologists, managers, and support staff  from each
agency and, over the next 2 years, the Team met more than 25
times to develop what the agencies referred to as “a new paradigm
and decision making process for managing [BOR]’s Project in a
manner that provides more certainty for [KIP] water users, [UKL]
elevations, and Klamath River flows than in the past” (NMFS
and USFWS 2013:4).  
A central goal of the new approach was to address the uncertainty
and instability associated with past ESA implementation, which
had, at different times over the previous decade, resulted in water
shortages for irrigators, insufficient water for salmon in the Lower
Basin, and insufficient lake levels for the suckers in the Upper
Basin. Reducing uncertainty around water availability and timing
for fish and farmers was a major motivator for collaboration, as
described by this NMFS employee:  
The tribal people want certainty. They want salmon runs
to be robust and resilient and plentiful. The tribes also,
of course, want more stability in their communities, you
know, more stable fish runs, and more fish will provide
them some of that. Stability and sustainability of their
culture and their people. The water users in the Upper
Basin … they want certainty of water. What’s really
important is they know how much water … they’ll have
access to. Delivered to them. Super important. 
(Interview, NMFS) 
As such, the 2013 BiOp was born of a new approach to annual
water sharing that addressed the irrigators’ needs, the suckers’
needs, and the salmon’s needs, exemplifying governmental
capacity for flexibility and evolution within the constraints of
formal law. It represented a fundamental shift from a single species
approach to ESA implementation to an approach more reflective
of systems thinking (although it still lacked consideration of
private lands) that attempted to better acknowledge both the
bioregion and the important role of the larger social context in
developing solutions with legitimacy (Fig. 3). The capacity for
this dramatic shift can partially be attributed to the general
increase in communication, data sharing, and collaboration
between basin stakeholders during the KBRA and KHSA
negotiation period of roughly 2005–2010. As we discuss below,
however, there were a few key aspects of the social dynamics of
stakeholder relations in the basin that led to increased integration
in the 2013 BiOp and associated processes. Specifically, the BiOp
featured new levels of integration in four dimensions: between the
action agency and the Services in the development of the proposed
action; between the Services in the development of the BiOp;
between biologists and hydrologists in seeking to better
understand and manage the system; and among federal agencies
and stakeholders in identifying innovative strategies for
complying with the law that avoided putting all the risk on any
one species or stakeholder.
Fig. 3. Section 7 Consultation Process for 2013 Joint Biological
Opinion: Integrated Approach. Stakeholders collaborated on a
water sharing plan using hydrologic modeling. Stakeholders
shared data and information with Bureau of Reclamation
(BOR) in development of proposed action (PA). BOR worked
with National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) to develop the PA in a coordinated
way that took into account needs of fish. NMFS and FWS
hired hydrologists to facilitate data and information sharing
and improve communication about the conservation role of the
action area in the survival and recovery of the listed species and
in the recovery support function of critical habitat. NMFS and
FWS issued a No Jeopardy Joint biological opinion (BiOp) that
took into account needs of irrigators. Process featured
collaborative, coordinated, integrated, proactive approach to
development of PA and BiOp.
Shared responsibility for Section 7 compliance
In the past, BOR had always managed water resources in close
collaboration with KIP water users. During the development of
the joint BiOp, the agency expanded its sphere of concern to
include the Services and, by extension, the ESA-listed fish and
the stakeholder groups advocating on their behalf, e.g., tribes and
fishermen.  
A key variable was a new regional director in the local BOR office
who had “a whole different attitude towards Section 7 and
working with [the Services], and the responsibility that BOR had
to implement the ESA” (Interview, FWS). In a departure from the
past, the new director convened a meeting of federal agency
leaders and proposed a new approach involving setting allocations
for KIP, the river, and UKL. As told by a FWS biologist, the new
BOR director proposed,  
... dividing up the pie three ways with the priority being
for the lake and the river, and [KIP] would get whatever
was left. And that was really another kind of “aha”
moment. In the past, the way the proposed action was
developed was BOR decided how much water [KIP]
needed, or they just said we’re going to operate as we had
in the past. And then the fish are gonna get whatever is
left over, and that was one of the reasons there was
jeopardy, was because there was no certainty for the fish,
and obviously the ESA does not allow all the risk to be
put on the species. So when [the new BOR director]
came, he kind of turned this around and asked [the
Services], “OK, you tell us how much water you need
and that’s what we’ll give you, and [KIP] will take
whatever is left over.” (Interview, FWS) 
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This attitude represented a radical shift to the FWS biologists,
who felt that BOR had been somewhat dismissive of its
obligations under the ESA in the past and was now recognizing
the importance of prioritizing the functionality and stability of
the ecological system before trying to accommodate human use.
It represented “a larger view that they, being part of the federal
government, had responsibilities under Section 7 to consult, and
consultation does not mean just delivering a BA [to the Services]”
(Interview, FWS).  
It is critical to note that BOR’s attitude was made possible by the
water users’ interest in collaborating and their newfound
willingness to make some concessions in exchange for more
certainty, both of which were a result of increased trust associated
with the KBRA discussions. As one water user recalled,  
We said, “Look, we’d be willing to trade some quantity
of water, take less, in exchange for knowing early and
having it be more stable, more secure.” Cause even if
you’re short, if you know it at the beginning, you can
manage, you can adjust. (Interview, KWUA) 
Another important shift had to do with BOR-NMFS relations.
While BOR and FWS had developed a good working relationship
over the years as a result of being in the same U.S. Department
(Interior) and both having offices in Klamath Falls (Oregon), the
relations between BOR and NMFS, located in the U.S.
Department of Commerce and housed “locally” in Arcata,
California (several hundred miles away), were more strained. The
new BOR director worked to actively engage NMFS staff  to
overcome the physical distance and institutional divide, inviting
them, along with FWS, to help with the formulation of a proposed
action that would meet the fishes’ needs.  
The new dynamic fostered a sense of shared responsibility among
the three agencies for both the proposed action and the listed
species, which led to a greater willingness to share data and
compare notes and even include stakeholders in the process to the
degree allowed by law. One FWS biologist observed that “having
a longer period for the consultation and involving everybody”
facilitated an improved problem-solving and trust-building
approach.  
That really emphasized to me that that’s the way
consultations should work for these large projects. You
need to take more time and be as open as you can with
stakeholders. There has to be a shared responsibility
among all the agencies [knowing that] the full process
will be more successful if we’re all working together than
if we just try to use traditional tools like jeopardy and
reasonable and prudent measures. (Interview, FWS) 
The improved interagency dynamics (illustrated in Fig. 3),
coupled with larger, basin-wide discussions among stakeholders
(the constituents to which each agency is beholden) happening at
the same time, facilitated a switch from a single species approach
to a more integrated, SES approach characterized by a focus on
relationships, processes, and feedbacks in the system rather than
trying to control and optimize a single characteristic or property
of the system, aligning the process in many ways with resilience
theory (Benson 2012).  
Critical to the success of the consultation process leading to the
2013 joint BiOp was a shared commitment among leaders in all
three federal agencies to find a way to improve stability for water
users while protecting the listed species. This approach stood in
contrast to the “fish vs. farmers” framing of previous
consultations. With the development of new social norms around
agency interactions, there was less fear and uncertainty among
the stakeholders, who felt more free to engage in creative problem
solving involving the use of hydrologic modeling, which was
critical to uncovering unexpected flexibility in the system.
Hydrologic modeling: a tool to facilitate social and technical
learning and systems thinking
Most BiOps under the ESA are researched and written exclusively
by biologists and ecologists from the Services. However, to better
support the development of the 2013 Klamath joint BiOp, NMFS
and FWS hired hydrologists to facilitate data and information
sharing and to improve communication during the consultation
process. The goal of these new hires was to help the agencies better
understand a critical aspect of the ESA: the conservation role of
the action area in the survival and recovery of the listed species
and in the recovery support function of critical habitat.  
It was very obvious to everybody that we needed a
hydrologist. We [the biologists] couldn’t do it. If you
think about it, with all the biological uncertainty, and
then add to that hydrologic uncertainty, it’s just too much.
There’s no way you can find any flexibility with that many
unknowns. (Interview, FWS) 
The Services realized that they needed hydrologists not only to
enhance communication, but also to be on more even footing with
BOR hydrologists and to create space for authentic dialogue about
where there might be flexibility in the system. The agency
hydrologists were included in a technical team convened by the
Klamath Tribes’ hydrologist that represented the Lower Basin
tribes, irrigators, and PacifiCorp, who owned the downstream
dams. Stakeholders shared data and information with BOR,
which worked with NMFS and FWS to develop the proposed
action in a coordinated way that took into account needs of all
listed fish. Relationship-building processes associated with
KBRA negotiations were also critical in facilitating, inspiring,
and catalyzing the collaborative modeling effort.  
Two aspects of the modeling effort were transformational: the
greater dependence on hydrologic science to better understand
the system and eliminate power imbalances among the agencies,
and the engagement of stakeholders in the modeling and learning
about system function. By using hydrologic modeling to provide
more certainty about what water they could possibly expect in the
future, the agencies were able to take a more creative approach to
problem solving. Focusing on the system (ecohydrology) rather
than on a single species (biology) resulted in increased
transparency about system limits, e.g., flows and water levels,
which reduced tension and competitiveness among the agencies.
Improved understanding of the system enabled improved
congruence between rules and ecological conditions and
improved “institutional fit” between the ESA and the basin SES
(Olsson et al. 2006, Rijke et al. 2012). It also allowed the agencies
to incorporate adaptive management into real-time KIP
operations instead of trying to prescribe flows in the BiOp. In
addition, the use of hydrologic modeling enhanced participants’
ability to communicate and learn about system dynamics,
resulting in a switch from a focus on optimizing water in different
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parts of the system for water users and individual species to a
focus on fostering complexity, e.g., downstream pulses, and
adaptive capacity (better predictions and ongoing opportunities
for learning about the ecohydrology of the system).  
Supporting the interagency consultation were side meetings
among leaders of the Klamath Tribes, the Lower Basin tribes, and
the irrigators about hydrologic modeling of the basin. These
leaders had been meeting regularly to aid the developing
collaborative approach to large-scale restoration of the entire
basin associated with KBRA and KHSA, partially under the
auspices of the ongoing FERC process to relicense (or remove)
dams associated with the Klamath Hydroelectric Project (Gosnell
and Kelly 2010, Chaffin and Gosnell 2017). As a result of these
ongoing negotiations, stakeholders had already established an
admittedly unusual degree of collaborative capacity and trust
before getting involved in consultation for the joint BiOp.  
There were discussions that had already taken place,
there were these coalitions that were building, there was
just a lot more trust in the basin and less acrimony at
least among the [KIP] water users and downstream
tribes and Klamath Tribes. (Interview, FWS) 
These side meetings helped advance a shared understanding of
the basin’s large, socially and geographically connected hydrology.
We argue that this shared understanding of the system led to more
acceptance of potential sharing of scarce water resources.
According to a FWS participant in the consultation process,  
... the meetings were especially helpful for educating the
Lower Basin tribes about the hydrology and how much
water was really there that could be used for the river.
And the water users were also at these meetings. So I
think all these things had to work together … you had to
have the stakeholders’ support, especially the Indian
tribes, but also the water users. They had to agree to this
whole new process of having more certainty about what
they would get but less of a supply. And then the Indian
tribes had to realize that there were limits on how much
water could be available at certain times of the year. 
(Interview, FWS) 
The meetings had the dual purpose of promoting learning about
the biophysical aspects of the system and its limits while also
enhancing trust and communication, as the tribes and the water
users were able to ask questions of the hydrologists and of each
other. A FWS biologist summed this process up by observing that,
“trust is established when the data gathering and analysis is done
openly and cooperatively” (Interview, FWS).  
The enhanced trust among the agencies and stakeholders meant
that the biologists at NMFS and FWS had more flexibility to
write the joint BiOp without fear of litigation.  
Our attorneys played a very minor role in this BiOp
compared to ones in the past. In past BiOps sometimes
we were sitting down with the attorneys and writing these
things together. The biologist would write something and
the attorneys would look at it because they didn’t want
the BiOp to be vulnerable to a lawsuit by the water users
or the tribes or the fishermen. In the past NMFS, FWS,
and BOR each had an attorney involved in the whole
process. It wasn’t like that this time. There was still a
concern about being arbitrary and capricious but there
was less concern about being sued. So the attorneys really
backed off. (Interview, FWS) 
The reduced fear of litigation enabled a more creative approach
to developing the BiOp that included risk taking not usually
associated with the consultation process. A FWS biologist
concluded that “minimizing the involvement of lawyers in the
consultation process and writing of the BiOp improves creative
problem solving, but is only possible in an atmosphere of trust.”  
Ultimately, NMFS and FWS issued a nonjeopardy joint BiOp
that took into account the needs of both the fish and the irrigators.
The BiOp authorized an operation model that is updated with
water availability and use data each day, an approach that was
expected to provide “close to real-time” data to enhance
coordination between water elevations in UKL and Klamath
River flows to be more reflective of natural variations, including
occasional high flows for downstream salmon. As part of the
process, NMFS had to come to terms with the fact that it could
not prescribe high flows for a specific time; rather it had to devolve
authority to local managers to allow high flows when possible
based on real-time climatic conditions. We suggest that this
concession to flexibility represented a transition toward
incorporating adaptive capacity and the recognition of natural
limits into real-time operation.  
The collaborative modeling process facilitated transformative
learning, leading participants to view the system in a more
collective and holistic manner than they had before. This process,
along with complimentary side-meetings among stakeholders,
increased subsidiarity, tightened feedback loops for increased
flexibility in water management response, and created more
stability for water users. Sharing information led to more trust.
The process was more integrated, with strengthened vertical and
horizontal cross-scale linkages.  
It is important to note that the 2013 BiOp, although unique in
scope and approach, was not innovative enough in and of itself
to foster lasting “peace” in the basin. After the expiration of the
proposed KBRA and KHSA (without federal approval and
funding, federal agencies could not participate in the terms of the
agreement, which included KHP dam removal and basin-scale
restoration activities), the FERC proceedings on the KHP dams
were reinstated and the owner, PacifiCorp, came to an agreement
with the Department of Interior for removal of four mainstem
hydroelectric dams on the river (see Chaffin and Gosnell 2017).
The planned dam removal represents just one aspect of the holistic
approach to basin restoration proposed in the original KBRA
and KHSA, and, in effect, negates other important aspects
necessary for systemic change of water and associated species
governance in the basin. In 2015 and 2016, conditions in the Lower
Klamath River precipitated the spread of disease among
returning coho salmon, causing high rates of mortality; under the
2013 BiOp, this two-year period should have triggered the BOR
to reinitiate consultation with NMFS and FWS, but it did not.
In late 2016, the Hoopa Valley Tribe (Lower Basin) filed suit to
force BOR to reinitiate consultation; in February 2017, a judge
from the U.S. District Court agreed (Table 1).
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DISCUSSION: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL FOR
ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE
In spite of recent events in the basin, we argue that the 2013 joint
BiOp provides important lessons and insights into the role of law
in adaptive governance. Cosens et al. (2017) note the current
“dearth of legal mechanisms at any level that allow for alternatives
to traditional environmental enforcement ... alternatives [that]
could enhance local adaptive capacity while maintaining stability
and accountability toward achieving the goals that traditional
enforcement mechanisms seek to achieve.” As the Klamath case
suggests, this potential can be realized even in SES controversies
with Section 7 at their core. The Klamath case provides insights
into the ways in which law can evolve to make room for and even
begin to institutionalize adaptive governance, in spite of periodic
setbacks.
Participatory capacity among stakeholders
Although a main focus of this paper has been on the role of
interagency relations, it is important to note that the impetus for
change came from the stakeholders. Their determination to find
an alternative approach to ESA implementation “trickled up” to
influence, inspire, and motivate the agencies.  
The tribes and the water users were setting an example.
It was hard for the agencies to ignore them. The agencies
finally realized they needed to take advantage of that and
emulate that. (Interview, FWS) 
And I always kind of remind them, “You know the reason
you are working together is because of us. It’s not because
of you guys, it’s because we drug you together.” We being
us, the tribes, the key groups. And us doing that has made
the agencies, their lives, a lot easier. (Interview, KWUA) 
Over the course of the three-year consultation process that began
in 2010, stakeholders and agency leaders began to see each other
differently and developed new relationships, both personal and
professional. Set against a backdrop of shifting tribal-irrigator
power relations (Gosnell and Kelly 2010), some of these
relationships had their origins in processes associated with the
negotiation and support of the KBRA during the previous five
years; nevertheless, the interactions associated specifically with
the development of a joint BiOp added a new dimension because
of the collective focus on understanding the biophysical system
as a whole for the purpose of balancing stability and flexibility in
KIP operations and avoiding jeopardy for listed species.
Facilitating social and technical learning
A key factor in the success of the consultation process leading to
the 2013 joint BiOp was the ability to learn more about the system
through data and information sharing and through hydrologic
modeling, which allowed agency biologists and ecologists to see
the system differently, shifting their focus from the life history of
single species to the ecohydrology of the whole basin, an example
of multiple loop learning (Armitage et al. 2008, Pahl-Wostl 2009).
The collaborative approach to hydrologic modeling helped the
agencies come to terms with inherent connectivity and
uncertainty in the SES as they began to consider how water use
and allocation in the system could be improved. The approach
built on other learning experiences associated with KBRA
negotiations that facilitated an expanded sense of place amongst
stakeholders, who began to see the basin (and the effects of their
water demand) in terms of a “whole” basin, not just isolated
Upper and Lower Basins (Gosnell and Kelly 2010). Once the
ecohydrologic system was better understood, stakeholders and
government actors were empowered to improve “institutional fit”
to better match the social and ecohydrologic dynamics.  
We argue that ESA implementation without support for social
and technical learning is incompatible with adaptive governance.
Section 7 can be a trigger for social-ecological reorganization,
adaptation, or transformation, but the right learning processes
and forums must be present, otherwise Section 7 is more likely to
act like a detonator than a stabilizer. As Rogers et al. (2013) note,
“[d]eep reflection leading to transformational learning is required
to foster the changes in mindset and behaviors needed to adopt
a complexity frame of reference.”
Trust and empathic leadership in federal agencies and among
stakeholders
One aspect of the improved process in the Klamath Basin had to
do with the attention the federal agencies gave to proactively
negotiating and articulating a shared vision of the “desired state”
for the SES (Chaffin et al. 2014b). In order to collaboratively
develop an integrated joint BiOp, agency leaders had to expand
their historic spheres of responsibility and concern to include new
elements. The BOR had to proactively incorporate the needs of
the fish into its proposed action, and the Services had to develop
a greater appreciation not only for “each other’s fish” (both
suckers and salmon) but also for the needs of the water users.
There had to be a shared responsibility among the three federal
agencies for BOR’s proposed action as well as conservation of the
listed species.  
Although recognition of the important role that emotions played
in Klamath Basin negotiations during the first decade of the 2000s
is nothing new (one has only to count the number of times locals
teared up and talked about a “change in heart” when interviewed
in the recent documentary film, A River Between Us, http://www.
ariverbetweenus.com/), scholars interested in adaptive governance
and SES transformation have yet to adequately theorize the
important role played by these emotional geographies. Building
on theories regarding the role of trust and social entrepreneurship
in adaptive governance (Folke et al. 2005, Westley et al. 2011),
this case reveals the importance of a culture of compassion and
empathy for cultivating cross-scale interactions and a collective
sense of stability, which created space for actors to deliberately
transform institutions to support adaptive governance. Although
the adaptive governance literature highlights the important role
of social capital, including trust, collaboration, participatory
capacity, leadership, social networks, and social learning (Folke
et al. 2005), it focuses on the societal or group level of this
phenomenon. It generally ignores the psychology of emotions,
cognitive framing, empathy, and reconciliation in the creation and
maintenance of social capital, which in turn supports society’s
adaptive capacity (e.g., Seyfarth and Cheney 2013, Arnold 2014).
For example, strong leadership is central to the development of
social capital and the adaptive capacity of governance systems,
but the emotional aspects of leadership strategies have not been
adequately acknowledged in the adaptive governance literature
(Moore and Westley 2011, Evans et al. 2015).  
In the Klamath case, a synergistic combination of leaders from
different federal agencies and stakeholder groups came to a shared
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understanding that collaboration, humility, mutual respect, and
empathy were necessary and desirable for progress to be made.  
Empathy is one of the things we need to be able to resolve
this with, but dang, that’s a tough thing. How do you get
a rancher to know what it means to be a tribal person
with that kind of history and that way of looking at the
world? And how does the tribal person know the rancher’s
way of viewing the resource? Those kinds of things are
very difficult. (Interview, Klamath Watershed Council) 
Essential to the Klamath Basin social dynamics was the
willingness and even desire to share limited water resources as
well as information and data about the system. The willingness
to share resulted from the cultivation of trust among federal
agency leaders and the different groups of stakeholders. Such
willingness was critical to the success of the joint BiOp because
the expanded understanding of the system hinged on sharing of
data and information that had not taken place in the past because
of a siloed, fragmented approach to Section 7 implementation
and distrust between agency scientists. The willingness to share
water came from trust that reduced quantity of water would be
compensated with greater certainty about amounts and better
timing of adjustments.  
The desire to share, however, was cultivated by the emergence of
a culture of compassion and empathy among participants in the
consultation process as well as the preceding KBRA process. In
our interviews and in the popular media, stakeholders and federal
agency leaders associated with water negotiations in the Klamath
consistently reported experiencing an expanded sense of place
and sphere of concern and empathy involving a “change in heart”
for fish and people elsewhere in the basin that they had not
previously considered. Several spoke of having been transformed
or of transformative learning experiences that resulted in
epiphanies about the basin’s social and ecological dynamics and
an expanded sense of concern, compassion, and empathy for
people and species in other places.  
Taken together, compassion and empathy are important
precursors to what many adaptive governance scholars recognize
as a crucial ingredient, trust. Participants in the consultation
process leading to the 2013 joint BiOp trusted that even if
environmental conditions changed and Section 7 consultation
had to be reinitiated, the relationships they had forged and the
collective culture of compassion and empathy would ensure that
they would be treated fairly. Aside from any legal documentation,
the core participants felt accountability to one another to ensure
a legitimate, fair approach to sharing, even if  resources became
scarcer.  
Although trust and empathy played an important role in enabling
an integrated, collaborative approach, so too did nontribal
stakeholders’ fear of tribal power. It is important to note that at
least part of the transformation reflected in the joint BiOp was
the result of the failure of previous processes, including expensive
lawsuits, to produce lasting beneficial results. Also, it was evident
to some water users in the basin that the Klamath Tribes might
apply their senior water rights in ways that could inhibit
economically viable agriculture. This fear was realized in 2013
when the Klamath Tribes “called the river”[1] for the first time
after receiving legal quantification of water rights in the Klamath
Water Adjudication Court proceedings. The Tribes called on their
water to be left instream for sucker habitat when low Upper Basin
tributary flows occurred in June 2013. For the first time since
Euro-American settlement of the basin, some Upper Basin
farmers with land located upstream of the historical Klamath
Tribes’ reservation and upstream of the KIP had their water use
reduced or curtailed. Some members of this stakeholder group
had been among the most vocal opponents of the KBRA and
KHSA, but they returned to the negotiating table in 2013–2014
after this call on their water rights by the Klamath Tribes (see
Table 1; Upper Klamath Basin Comprehensive Agreement 2014).
CONCLUSION: BUILDING FORUMS FOR ADAPTIVE
GOVERNANCE
In this article, we have sought to contribute to understanding of
the role of law in adaptive governance by exploring the ways in
which a seemingly rigid law like the ESA can be operationalized
through an integrated problem solving approach and a focus on
enhancing participatory capacity through forums for social and
technical learning about a particular SES. The 2013 joint BiOp
in the Klamath Basin was a historic first, in that it was the first
time the two (often disparate) agencies entrusted with
implementing the ESA came to a set of coordinated, place-based
recommendations for conserving terrestrial and anadromous
species at a basin-wide scale. The history of Section 7
implementation in the Klamath Basin provides an excellent case
study of vastly different approaches to implementing the law.  
The approach described herein both reflected and contributed to
a fundamental change in the structure and function of the SES,
and the resultant joint BiOp served to institutionalize this new
trajectory to some degree, allowing it to gain power and
legitimacy. In that sense, the Klamath case also provides insights
into how institutionalization of emergent adaptive governance
takes place. Although the good will engendered by the KBRA
negotiations and the collaborative processes leading up to the
2013 joint BiOp may not be permanent, as recent events suggest,
we argue that stronger interagency relationships built on trust and
a mutual understanding of SES dynamics, specifically the
ecohydrology of the basin, provide a new baseline capacity for
integrated problem solving in the future. We argue that the joint
BiOp represents at least a partial social transformation involving
change in behavior, procedures, customs, norms, values, and
beliefs that altered environmental governance in the basin.  
In closing, we emphasize that the value of the Klamath case is
not so much that it provides evidence that Section 7 need not be
contentious; rather, we see it as providing lessons for legal
programs managing SESs more broadly, e.g., Section 404
permitting under the Clean Water Act, environmental
assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act, and
water planning, forest planning, and land use planning more
generally. These lessons include identifying leaders who can
creatively avoid entrenched silos and facilitate interagency
collaboration, take a proactive approach that involves affected
parties in early stages of problem solving, and provide
opportunities for collaborative social and technical learning to
enhance SES understanding. The Klamath case also suggests the
need for more serious exploration of the role of empathy and
emotional geographies more generally in SES functioning and the
need for further investigation into the benefits and challenges of
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interagency collaboration involving interdisciplinary considerations
of whole systems, e.g., the ways in which different species and
both biotic and abiotic factors interact with one another. Such
holistic, integrated approaches to governing water resource
allocation will become more important as water scarcity related
to climate change continues to threaten both biodiversity and
agricultural livelihoods.




This work was developed as part of the Adaptive Water Governance
Project, funded by the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis
Center (SESYNC) under funding from the National Science
Foundation, NSF DBI-1052875. The authors would like to thank
Barbara Cosens and Ron Larson for their valuable insights and
feedback, which strengthened the article, along with Klamath Basin
stakeholders who agreed to be interviewed. We also thank Anna
Crockett for cartographic support and design.
LITERATURE CITED
Armitage, D., M. Marschke, and R. Plummer. 2008. Adaptive co-
management and the paradox of learning. Global Environmental
Change 18(1):86-98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.07.002  
Arnold, C. A. 2004. Working out an environmental ethic:
anniversary lessons from Mono Lake. Wyoming Law Review 
4:1-55.  
Arnold, C. A. 2014. Framing watersheds. Pages 271-302 in K. H.
Hirokawa, editor. Environmental law and contrasting ideas of
nature: a constructivist approach. Cambridge University Press,
Boston, Massachusetts, USA. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781139519762.015  
Arnold, C. A. 2015. Environmental law, episode IV: a new hope?
Can environmental law adapt for resilient communities and
ecosystems? Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 21
(1):1-46.  
Arnold, C. A., O. O. Green, D. A. DeCaro, A. Chase, and J. G.
Ewa. 2014. The social-ecological resilience of an eastern urban-
suburban watershed: the Anacostia River Basin. Idaho Law
Review 51:29-90.  
Benson, M. H. 2012. Intelligent tinkering: the Endangered Species
Act and resilience. Ecology and Society 17(4):28. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5751/ES-05116-170428  
California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG). 2004.
September 2002 Klamath River fish-kill: final analysis of
contributing factors and impacts. Northern California-North
Coast Region, The Resources Agency, State of California, USA.
[online] URL: http://waterwatch.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/08/2002CAFinalKlamathFishKillReport.pdf  
Carpenter, S. R., and W. A. Brock. 2008. Adaptive capacity and
traps. Ecology and Society 13(2):40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-02716-130240  
Chaffin, B. C., R. K. Craig, and H. Gosnell. 2014a. Resilience,
adaptation and transformation in the Klamath River Basin social-
ecological system. Idaho Law Review 51:157-194.  
Chaffin, B. C., A. S. Garmestani, H. Gosnell, and R. K. Craig.
2016a. Institutional networks and adaptive water governance in
the Klamath River Basin, USA. Environmental Science & Policy 
57:112-121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2015.11.008  
Chaffin, B. C., A. S. Garmestani, L. H. Gunderson, M. H. Benson,
D. G. Angeler, C. A. (T.) Arnold, B. Cosens, R. K. Craig, J. B.
Ruhl, and C. R. Allen. 2016b. Transformative environmental
governance. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 
41:399-423. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-110615-085817  
Chaffin, B. C., and H. Gosnell. 2017. Beyond mandatory
fishways: federal hydropower relicensing as a window of
opportunity for dam removal and adaptive governance of riverine
landscapes in the United States. Water Alternatives 10
(3):819-839.  
Chaffin, B. C., H. Gosnell, and B. A. Cosens. 2014b. A decade of
adaptive governance scholarship: synthesis and future directions.
Ecology and Society 19(3):56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-06824-190356  
Chapin III, F. S., G. P. Kofinas, and C. Folke, editors. 2009.
Principles of ecosystem stewardship: resilience-based natural
resource management in a changing world. Springer-Verlag, New
York, New York, USA.  
Cosens, B. A., R. K. Craig, S. Hirsch, C. A. (T.) Arnold, M. H.
Benson, D. A. DeCaro, A. S. Garmestani, H. Gosnell, J. Ruhl,
and E. Schlager. 2017. The role of law in adaptive governance.
Ecology and Society 22(1):30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-08731-220130  
Craig, R. K. 2014. Does the Endangered Species Act preempt
state water law? University of Kansas Law Review 62:851.  
Craig, R. K., A. S. Garmestani, C. Allen, C. A. Arnold, H. Birge,
D. DeCaro, A. Fremier, H. Gosnell, and E. Schlager. 2017.
Balancing stability and flexibility in adaptive governance: an
analysis of tools available in U.S. environmental law. Ecology and
Society 22(2):3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-08983-220203  
DeCaro, D. A., C. A. (T.) Arnold, E. F. Boamah, and A. S.
Garmestani. 2017. Understanding and applying principles of
social cognition and decision making in adaptive environmental
governance. Ecology and Society 22(1):33. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5751/ES-09154-220133  
Doremus, H., and A. D. Tarlock. 2008. Water war in the Klamath
Basin: macho law, combat biology, and dirty politics. Island Press,
Washington, D.C., USA  
duToit, D., and S. Pollard. 2008. Updating public participation
in IWRM: a proposal for a focused and structured engagement
with Catchment Management Strategies. Water SA (6):707-713.  
Evans, L. S., C. C. Hicks, P. J. Cohen, P. Case, M. Prideaux, and
D. J. Mills. 2015. Understanding leadership in the environmental
sciences. Ecology and Society 20(1):50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-07268-200150  
Folke, C. 2006. Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for
social-ecological systems analyses. Global Environmental Change 
16(3):253-267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.04.002  
Ecology and Society 22(4): 42
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss4/art42/
Folke, C., F. S. Chapin III, and P. Olsson. 2009. Transformations
in ecosystem stewardship. Pages 103-128 in F. S. Chapin, G. P.
Kofinas, and C. Folke, editors. Principles of ecosystem
stewardship: resilience-based natural resource management in a
changing world. Springer-Verlag, New York, New York, USA.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-73033-2_5  
Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg. 2005. Adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems. Annual Review of
Environmental Resources 30:441-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.energy.30.050504.144511  
Foster, S. 2002. Environmental justice in an age of devolved
collaboration. Harvard Environmental Law Review 26:459-498.  
Gosnell, H. 2001. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act and
the art of compromise: the evolution of a reasonable and prudent
alternative for the Animas-La Plata Project. Natural Resources
Journal 41(3):561-626.  
Gosnell, H., and E. Kelly. 2010. Peace on the river? Social-
ecological restoration and large dam removal in the Klamath
Basin, USA. Water Alternatives 3(2):361-383.  
Grantham, H. S., M. Bode, E. McDonald-Madden, E. T. Game,
A. T. Knight, and H. P. Possingham. 2010. Effective conservation
planning requires learning and adaptation. Frontiers in Ecology
and the Environment 8:431-437. http://dx.doi.org/10.1890/080151  
Gunderson, L. H. 2013. How the Endangered Species Act
promotes unintelligent, misplaced tinkering. Ecology and Society 
18(1):12. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05601-180112  
Gunderson, L. H., A. S. Garmestani, K. W. Rizzardi, J. B. Ruhl,
and A. Light. 2014. Escaping a rigidity trap: governance and
adaptive capacity to climate change in the Everglades social-
ecological system. Idaho Law Review 51:127.  
Holling, C. S. 2001. Understanding the complexity of economic,
ecological, and social systems. Ecosystems 4(5):390-405. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10021-001-0101-5  
Huitema, D., E. Mostert, W. Egas, S. Moellenkamp, C. Pahl-
Wostl, and R. Yalcin. 2009. Adaptive water governance: assessing
the institutional prescriptions of adaptive (co-) management from
a governance perspective and defining a research agenda. Ecology
and Society 14(1):26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-02827-140126  
Jaeger, W. K. 2004. Conflicts over water in the Upper Klamath
Basin and the potential role for market-based allocations. Journal
of Agriculture and Resource Economics 29(2):167-184.  
Karkkainen, B. C. 2008. Getting to “let's talk”: legal and natural
destabilizations and the future of regional collaboration. Nevada
Law Journal 8:811-829.  
Larson, K. L., and D. Lach. 2010. Equity in urban water
governance through participatory, place-based approaches.
Natural Resources Journal 50:407-430.  
Moore, M.-L., O. Tjornbo, E. Enfors, C. Knapp, J. Hodbod, J.
A. Baggio, A. Norström, P. Olsson, and D. Biggs. 2014. Studying
the complexity of change: toward an analytical framework for
understanding deliberate social-ecological transformations.
Ecology and Society 19(4):54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-06966-190454  
Moore, M.-L., and F. Westley. 2011. Surmountable chasms:
networks and social innovation for resilient systems. Ecology and
Society 16(1):5. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-03812-160105  
National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (NMFS and USFWS). 2013. Biological opinions on the
effects of proposed Klamath Project operations from May 31, 2013,
through March 31, 2023, on five federally listed threatened and
endangered species. National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest
Region, Northern California Office and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Klamath Falls Fish and Wildlife Office, Oregon, USA.  
National Research Council (NRC). 2002. Scientific evaluation of
biological opinions on endangered and threatened fishes in the
Klamath River Basin: Interim Report. National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., USA.  
National Research Council (NRC). 2004. Endangered and
threatened fishes in the Klamath River Basin: causes of decline and
strategies for recovery. National Academies Press, Washington D.
C., USA.  
Olsson, P., L. H. Gunderson, S. R. Carpenter, P. Ryan, L. Lebel,
C. Folke, and C. S. Holling. 2006. Shooting the rapids: navigating
transitions to adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.
Ecology and Society 11(1):18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-01595-110118  
Pahl-Wostl, C. 2009. A conceptual framework for analysing
adaptive capacity and multi-level learning processes in resource
governance regimes. Global Environmental Change 19:354-365.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.06.001  
Pahl-Wostl, C., G. Becker, C. Kneiper, and J. Sendzimir. 2013.
How multilevel societal learning processes facilitate transformative
change: a comparative case study analysis on flood management.
Ecology and Society 18(4):58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-05779-180458  
Prokopy, L. S., N. Mullendore, K. Brasier, and K. Floress. 2014.
A typology of catalyst events for collaborative watershed
management in the United States. Society & Natural Resources
27 (11):1177-1191. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2014.918230  
Quick, K. S., and M. S. Feldman. 2011. Distinguishing
participation and inclusion. Journal of Planning Education and
Research 31(3):272-290. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0739456X11410979  
Rijke, J., R. Brown, C. Zevenbergen, R. Ashley, M. Farrelly, P.
Morison, and S. van Herk. 2012. Fit-for-purpose governance: a
framework to make adaptive governance operational.
Environmental Science & Policy 22:73-84. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.envsci.2012.06.010  
Rogers, K. H., R. Luton, H. Biggs, R. Biggs, S. Blignaut, A. G.
Choles, C. G. Palmer, and P. Tangwe. 2013. Fostering complexity
thinking in action research for change in social-ecological systems.
Ecology and Society 18(2):31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-05330-180231  
Ruhl, J. B. 2012. The Endangered Species Act’s fall from grace in
the Supreme Court. Harvard Environmental Law Review 36:487.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1953339  
Saundry, P. 2009. Endangered Species Act, United States. The
Encyclopedia of Earth. [online] URL: http://www.eoearth.org/
view/article/152413/  
Ecology and Society 22(4): 42
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss4/art42/
Sax, J. L., and R. B. Keiter. 2006. The realities of regional resource
management: Glacier National Park and its neighbors revisited.
Ecology Law Quarterly 33:233.  
Seyfarth, R. M., and D. L. Cheney. 2013. Affiliation, empathy,
and the origins of theory of mind. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 110 (Supplement 2):10349-10356. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1301223110  
Shilling, F. M., J. K. London, and R. S. Liévanos. 2009.
Marginalization by collaboration: environmental justice as a third
party in and beyond CALFED. Environmental Science and Policy 
12:694-709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2009.03.003  
U.S. Department of the Interior. 2010. Klamath Basin Restoration
Agreement for the sustainability of public and trust resources and
affected communities. U.S. Department of the Interior,
Washington, D.C., USA. [online] URL: http://klamathrestoration.
gov/sites/klamathrestoration.gov/files/Klamath-Agreements/Klamath-
Basin-Restoration-Agreement-2-18-10signed.pdf  
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries
Service (USFWS and NMFS). 1998. Endangered Species Act
consultation handbook: procedures for conducting Section 7
consultations and conferences. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
Washington, D.C., USA.  
Westley, F., P. Olsson, C. Folke, T. Homer-Dixon, H. Vredenburg,
D. Loorbach, J. Thompson, M. Nilsson, E. Lambin, J. Sendzimir,
B. Banerjee, V. Galaz, and S. van der Leeuw. 2011. Tipping toward
sustainability: emerging pathways of transformation. AMBIO: A
Journal of the Human Environment 40(7):762-778 http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s13280-011-0186-9
